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Abstract
This paper gives an axiomatic characterization of the Atkinson indices of segregation
for the multigroup case using a small number of purely ordinal axioms. We show
that the symmetric Atkinson index represents the unique ordering that treats ethnic
groups symmetrically, that is invariant to population growth rates that diﬀer among
ethnic groups, that ranks school districts as more segregated when schools in them
are subdivided (unless the new schools have the exact same ethnic distribution), and
that satisfy an independence property. If symmetry among ethnic groups is dropped
and a technical continuity axiom added, one obtains the family of orderings that are
represented by the asymmetric Atkinson indices.
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1 Introduction
Empirical research indicates that segregation aﬀects economic outcomes. For instance, Cut-
ler and Glaeser [6] find that residential racial segregation leads to higher dropout, idleness,
and single motherhood rates among African Americans. Others have found that occupa-
tional segregation by gender helps explain the gender gap in wages and that racial segregation
of schools helps explain the black-white achievement gap.1
While there seems to be a consensus that segregation is important, there is less agreement
about how to define it. Massey and Denton [19] discern five dimensions of segregation.
The first, evenness, is the tendency of ethnic groups to be distributed diﬀerently across
locations, such as neighborhoods or schools. This is also the definition favored by James
and Taeuber [15]. Massey and Denton’s other dimensions are isolation from the majority
group, concentration in a small area, centralization in the urban core, and clustering in a
contiguous enclave.
In this paper, we will focus exclusively on Massey and Denton’s first dimension of even-
ness. How best to measure this dimension of segregation remains an open question. A
number of indices have been proposed (Massey and Denton [19]). Selected properties of
these indices have been studied.2 However, this leaves some questions unanswered. Can
other indices be devised that also satisfy these properties? And what other properties do
the existing indices satisfy?
A more definitive approach is to provide an axiomatization: a set of properties A that
are satisfied by all and only the indices in some set. This answers the above two questions:
no other indices satisfy all of properties in A; any other properties of the indices in the set
must be implied by the properties in A.
This paper provides two axiomatizations: one for the symmetric Atkinson index, and one
1For gender segregation, see Cotter et al [5], Lewis [17], and Macpherson and Hirsh [18]. For school
segregation, see Boozer, Krueger, and Wolkon [2] and Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin [11].
2See, for instance, Duncan and Duncan [8], James and Taeuber [15], Massey and Denton [19], Reardon
and Firebaugh [21] for the multigroup case, and Zoloth [25].
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for the set of asymmetric Atkinson indices. The Atkinson indices were introduced by James
and Taeuber [15] and are based on the Atkinson family of inequality indices (Atkinson [1]).
Massey and Denton [19] study properties of the Atkinson indices and Johnston, Poulsen,
and Forrest [16] use them to study school segregation. While this literature has focused on
the case of two ethnic groups, we study the general multigroup case.
In this paper we will also focus on contexts in which geography is unimportant. In some
cases, such as residential neighborhoods, this might be a strong assumption. In others, it is
more innocuous. For instance, the presence of other schools near a given student’s school
typically does not have a great eﬀect on the student’s educational outcomes. Hence, our
presentation will focus on school district segregation. However, it should be clear that the
measures of segregation characterized here could also be applied to measure segregation in
other contexts such as gender segregation in the labor force.
We also restrict to ordinal axioms. Ordinal axioms are more appealing than cardinal
ones because they refer to bilateral comparisons and not to their specific functional repre-
sentations. Formally, we define a segregation ordering as a ranking of school districts from
least segregated to most segregated. We show that the ordering that is captured by the sym-
metric Atkinson index is the unique nontrivial ordering that satisfies the following axioms:
Group Symmetry, Scale Invariance, the Weak School Division Property, and Independence.
Informally, these axioms are defined as follows. Symmetry requires that the segregation
ordering be invariant to the renaming of the groups. Scale Invariance states that the segre-
gation ranking of a school district should depend only on how the diﬀerent ethnic groups are
distributed across schools, and not on the absolute sizes of these groups. The Weak School
Division Property states that in a school district that contains a single school, building a
new school to which some of the students are moved
1. cannot lower segregation in the district, and
2. leaves segregation unchanged if the ethnic distributions of the two resulting schools are
identical.
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Lastly, Independence states that the segregation ranking of two school districts with the
same size and ethnic distribution is unaﬀected by the addition of one identical school to each
of the two districts.
A simple representation of the symmetric Atkinson ordering is the Hutchen’s [13] Square
Root Index: one minus the sum, over all schools, of the geometric averages of the percentages
of each group who attend the school. For instance, in the case of two ethnic groups, suppose
40% of blacks and 10% of whites attend school A while 60% of blacks and 90% of whites
attend school B. The index equals 1 − (.4)1/2 (.1)1/2 − (.6)1/2 (.9)1/2 = 0.065. Abusing
terminology, we will call this the symmetric Atkinson index.3
We then drop Symmetry and show that all and only the asymmetric Atkinson orderings
satisfy the remaining axioms, with the addition of a technical Continuity axiom. Each
asymmetric Atkinson ordering is represented by the following index: one minus the sum,
over all the schools, of some weighted geometric average of the percentages of each group
who attend the school. In the above example this would equal 1− (.4)b (.1)1−b− (.6)b (.9)1−b
where b ∈ (0, 1) is the weight given to blacks. The parameters b trace out the full family of
asymmetric Atkinson orderings in the case of two ethnic groups.4
The paper is organized as follows. Concepts and notation are defined in Section 2.
Section 3 gives examples of segregation indices. Section 4 presents the axioms. Results
appear in section 5. In section 6, we conclude and discuss related literature. Proofs are
relegated to an appendix.
3The original Atkinson index is an increasing transformation of this index and thus captures the same
ordering (section 3).
4Throughout, we use “asymmetric” as shorthand for “not necessarily symmetric.” In particular, this set
includes the symmetric Atkinson index (b = 1/2).
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2 Definitions
We assume a continuum population. This technical assumption allows us to fully charac-
terize the Atkinson orderings by means of a few axioms. With a discrete population, the
Atkinson measures still satisfy our axioms; however, there may be other orderings that do
so as well. In practice, this flexibility allows a researcher to assign a diﬀerent weight to
diﬀerent groups of people; for instance, in the case of residential segregation, one might want
to assign diﬀerent weights to children vs. adults.
Formally, we define a (school) district as follows:
Definition 1 A district consists of
• A finite set of groups G, containing at least two elements,
• a nonempty and finite set of schools N ,
• and, for each ethnic group g ∈ G and for each school n ∈ N , a nonnegative number
Tng ∈ <+, representing the number of members of group g that reside in school n,5
such that the total population of group g in the district is positive: for all g ∈ G,
P
n∈N T
n
g >
0.
Fix an integer K > 1 and let C = C(K) be the set of districts whose set of ethnic groups,
G, contains precisely K groups. A segregation ordering < on the set of districts C is a
complete and transitive binary relation on that set. We interpret X < Y to mean “district
X is at least as segregated as district Y.” The relations ∼ and Â are derived from < in the
usual way.
A segregation index on C is a function that assigns a nonnegative number to each district
X ∈ C. Any segregation index S induces a segregation ordering defined by X < Y ⇔
5For instance, Tng = 127 means that neighborhood n contains 127 members of ethnic group g.
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S(X) ≥ S(Y ). As in utility theory, a segregation ordering may be represented by more
than one index, and there are segregation orderings that are not captured by any index.
For any district X =
­
(T ng )g∈G
®
n∈N , we denote the set of schools of X by N(X). We
will sometimes use a more compact notation. The expression h(1, 2) , (3, 1)i, for instance,
denotes a district with two ethnic groups (e.g., blacks and whites) and two schools. The first
school, (1, 2), contains one black and two whites; the second, (3, 1), contains three blacks
and one white. The order of the schools does not matter; e.g., h(1, 2) , (3, 4)i can also be
written h(3, 4) , (1, 2)i.
The following notation will be useful:
Tg =
X
n∈N
T ng : the number of members of group g in the district
T n =
X
g∈G
T ng : the total population of school n
T =
X
g∈G
Tg: the total population of the district
Pg =
Tg
T
: the proportion of district students who are in group g
P n =
T n
T
: the proportion of district students who are in school n
png =
T ng
T n
(for T n > 0): the proportion of students of n who are in g
tng =
T ng
Tg
: the proportion of members of g who attend n (1)
The group distribution of a district X is the vector (Pg)g∈G of proportions of the district’s
students who are in each group. The group distribution of a nonempty school n is the vector¡
png
¢
g∈G of proportions of the school’s students who are in each group. School n in district
X is representative if the group distributions of n and X are the same: if png = Pg for all
g ∈ G. A school that is not representative of the district is said to be unrepresentative.
For any two districts X and Y with the same set of groups, X ] Y denotes the result
of adjoining Y to X. Its schools are the union of the schools in X and Y . Formally, let
X =
­
(Tng )g∈G
®
n∈N and Y =
­
(T ng )g∈G
®
n∈N 0 with disjoint set of neighborhoods. Then X ]Y
denotes the city
­
(Tng )g∈G
®
n∈N∪N 0.
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3 Examples of segregation indices
We now discuss several examples of segregation indices. We begin with the symmetric
Atkinson index:
Symmetric Atkinson The symmetric Atkinson index A is defined by
A(X) = 1−
X
n∈N(X)
µY
g∈G
tng
¶ 1
|G|
(2)
When X contains exactly two nonempty groups, this index is an increasing transfor-
mation of the usual Atkinson index with parameter 1/2 (Massey and Denton [19, p.
286]).6 The symmetric Atkinson index is derived from the income inequality measure
of the same name (Atkinson [1]).
Asymmetric Atkinson Let w = (w1 . . . wK) be a vector of K nonnegative weights that
sum to one. The asymmetric Atkinson index with weights w, Aw, is defined by
Aw(X) = 1−
X
n∈N(X)
µY
g∈G
tng
¶wg
(3)
The weights may all be equal, in which case Aw is just the symmetric Atkinson index.
Unweighted Dissimilarity The Unweighted Dissimilarity index DU : C → [0, 1] is defined
by
DU(X) =
1
2(K − 1)
X
n∈N(X)
f(tn) where f(tn) =
X
g∈G
¯¯¯¯
¯tng −X
g0∈G
1
K
tng0
¯¯¯¯
¯ (4)
In the case of two groups, this index measures the proportion of either group who
would have to change schools in order to attain complete integration. This index was
6One can show that with two groups, the usual Atkinson index with parameter 1/2 equals 1−(1−A(X))2,
which is an increasing transformation of A.
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first discussed, for the case of two groups, by Jahn et al [14]. It was used by Cutler,
Glaeser, and Vigdor [7] to measure the evolution of segregation in American cities.7
Mutual Information The entropy of any discrete probability distribution q = (q1, . . . , qK)
(where
PK
k=1 qk = 1) is defined by
8
h(q) =
KX
k=1
qk log2
µ
1
qk
¶
.
The Mutual Information index equals the entropy of the district’s ethnic distribution
minus the average entropy of the ethnic distributions of its schools:
M(X) = h(P )−
X
n∈N
P nh(pn)
where P = (Pg)g∈G is the district ethnic distribution and pn = (png )g∈G is the ethnic
distribution of school n. This index is axiomatized in Frankel and Volij [10].
4 Axioms
We impose axioms not on the segregation index but on the underlying segregation ordering.
Our first axiom, Group Symmetry, states that the level of segregation in a district does not
depend on the labeling of the district’s demographic groups; it depends only on the number
of people in each group who attend each school. For instance, if “blacks” are relabeled
“whites” and vice-versa, then segregation does not change.
Group Symmetry (GS) LetX ∈ C be a district and letX 0 ∈ C be the district that results
from relabeling some or all of the groups in X. Then X ∼ X 0.
7The two-group Dissimilarity index of Jahn et al [14] can be generalized to the multigroup case in various
ways. The version in (4) gives equal weight to all groups and satisfies Scale Invariance. An alternative
version, which weights a group according to its relative size, is discussed by Reardon and Firebaugh [21] and
Frankel and Volij [10]. This alternative version does not satisfy Scale Invariance but does satisfy a diﬀerent
axiom, the Group Division Property, which DU violates.
8When qk = 0, the term qk log2(1/qk) is assigned the value zero.
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We will consider axiomatizations both with and without this axiom.
Arguably, in order to best capture Massey and Denton’s dimension of evenness, a mea-
sure would rank a district based solely on how the ethnic groups are distributed across the
district’s schools. The measure should not be “contaminated” by diﬀerences in the ethnic
size distribution from one district to another. This is formalized as follows:
Scale Invariance (SI) For any district X ∈ C, group g ∈ G(X), and constant α > 0, let
X 0 be the result of multiplying the number of group-g students in each school n in
district X by α. Then X 0 ∼ X.
Scale Invariance is one of the five requirements that Jahn et al [14] say a satisfactory measure
of segregation should satisfy.9 In their justification of Scale Invariance, James and Taeuber
write:
School segregation refers to racial variation in the distribution of students across
schools. ... This concept of segregation does not depend on the relative propor-
tions of blacks and whites in the system, but only upon the relative distributions
of students among schools.... [Taeuber and James [24, p. 134]]
Scale Invariance can be useful for longitudinal comparisons as it ensures that simple popu-
lation growth will not aﬀect a district’s segregation ranking. For instance, if the number
of blacks grows by 10% in all schools, while each ethnic group retains its distribution across
schools, then by this axiom segregation in the district is unaﬀected.
On the other hand, Scale Invariance may not be suitable in all contexts. For instance,
researchers who conceive of segregation as isolation from the majority group (Massey and
Denton’s second dimension) have generally not assumed this property (Coleman, Hoﬀer, and
Kilgore [4, p. 178]). For a diﬀerent axiomatization that does not assume Scale Invariance,
see Frankel and Volij [10].
9They write: “a satisfactory measure of ecological segregation should ... not be distorted by the size of
the total population, the proportion of Negroes, or the area of a city....” (Jahn et al [14]).
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Figure 1: Independence (IND). Panel a shows two districts, X and Y , that have the same size
and ethnic distribution. IND states that adjoining the same cluster containing a single school to
the two districts (panel b) does not aﬀect which district is more segregated.
Our next axiom is illustrated in Figure 1. In panel a, two districts, X and Y , are being
compared. The districts are assumed to have the same number of students from each ethnic
group.10 In panel b, a single school has been adjoined to each of these districts. The axiom
states that this addition should not aﬀect which district is more segregated: X ] Z is at
least as segregated as Y ] Z if and only if X is at least as segregated as Y .
Independence (IND) Let X,Y ∈ C be two districts with equal populations and equal
group distributions. Then for any district Z ∈ C that contains a single school, X < Y
if and only if X ] Z < Y ] Z.
Intuitively, the district X ] Z can be thought of as comprising two “clusters”: X and
Z. Define segregation within a cluster to be the segregation ranking of the cluster viewed in
isolation. Likewise, let between-cluster segregation be the segregation of the district when
each cluster is regarded as a single school. Independence follows from the notion that a
district’s segregation should be decomposable into a weighted sum of its between-cluster
and its within-cluster segregations. Why? First, between-cluster segregation is the same
10For instance, X and Y may each have 100 blacks, 1000 whites, and 50 Asians.
10
in each combined district in panel b. This is because X and Y have the same numbers
of members of each ethnic group, so they are identical when each is considered as a single
school. Moreover, segregation within cluster Z is clearly the same in the two combined
districts. Therefore, which of the combined districts in panel b is more segregated reduces
to whether cluster X is more segregated than cluster Y . This is the axiom of Independence.
In Section 5.2 we show that Independence is a precondition for an index to be additively
decomposable in a sense discussed by Hutchens [12].
By applying Independence repeatedly, the following lemma shows that the district Z
in the axiom can actually contain any number of schools. This property will be used
interchangeably with Independence.
Lemma 1 Suppose the segregation ordering < satisfies IND. Let X,Y ∈ C be two districts
with equal populations and equal group distributions. Then for all districts Z ∈ C containing
any number of schools, X < Y if and only if X ] Z < Y ] Z.
Proof. Let the schools of Z be enumerated: n1, ..., nN . By IND, X < Y if and only if
X ] hn1i < Y ] hn1i, where hn1i denotes a district that consists of school n1 alone. The
districts X 0 = X ] hn1i and Y 0 = Y ] hn1i have the same size and group distribution since
X and Y do. Hence, by IND, X 0 < Y 0 if and only if X 0 ] hn2i < Y 0 ] hn2i. The result
follows by repeating the same argument for schools n3, ..., nN . Q.E.D.
The next axiom is the Weak School Division Property. This axiom states that a one-
school district cannot become less segregated if the school is split into two new schools. In
addition, if the new schools have identical ethnic distributions, then segregation is unchanged.
Intuitively, since a single school is not segregated at all, splitting the school cannot lead to
lower segregation.11 And if the new schools have the same ethnic distribution, then the new
district is not segregated at all, like the original district.
11Our motivating example uses schools as the basic locational unit, so it ignores ability tracking and
other forms of within-school segregation. Our approach could easily be used to study these phenomena by
redefining basic locational unit to be the classroom or the ability group.
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Weak School Division Property (WSDP) LetX ∈ C be a district consisting of a single
school. LetX 0 be the district that results from subdividing this school into two schools,
n1 and n2. Then, X 0 < X. Further, if n1 and n2 have the same group distributions
(i.e., pn1g = pn2g for all g ∈ G), then X 0 ∼ X.
By combining Independence and WSDP, we can prove that the same conclusions hold if
the original district X contains any number of other schools in addition to the school that
is split. This is the School Division Property:
School Division Property (SDP) Let X ∈ C be any district and let n be a school in X.
Let X 0 be the district that results from X if school n is subdivided into two schools,
n1 and n2. Then, X 0 < X. Further, if n1 and n2 have the same group distributions
(i.e., pn1g = pn2g for all g ∈ G), then X 0 ∼ X.
Lemma 2 Suppose the segregation ordering < satisfies Independence and the Weak School
Division Property. Then < also satisfies the School Division Property.
Proof. Let Y denote the district X less the school n:
X = Y ] hni
X 0 = Y ] hn1, n2i .
By WSDP, hn1, n2i < hni. By IND, Y ] hn1, n2i < Y ] hni. If n1 and n2 have the same
population distribution then the symbol < can be replaced by ∼. Q.E.D.
The School Division Property is related to two properties that are discussed by James
and Taeuber [15] and subsequent authors. The first is organizational equivalence: if a school
is divided into two schools that have the same group distribution, the district’s level of
segregation does not change. The second is the transfer principle. When there are two
demographic groups, the transfer principle states that if a black (white) student moves
from one school to another school in which the proportion of blacks (whites) is higher,
then segregation in the district rises. In the case of two ethnic groups, SDP follows from
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organizational equivalence and the transfer principle.12 But while SDP applies directly with
any number of groups, it is unclear what form the transfer principle should take with more
than two groups.13
Our next axiom, Continuity, will be needed only when Group Symmetry is dropped.
Continuity (C) For any districts X,Y, Z ∈ C, the sets
{c ∈ [0, 1] : cX ] (1− c)Y < Z} and {c ∈ [0, 1] : Z < cX ] (1− c)Y }
are closed.
Our final axiom states that there exist two districts, one strictly more segregated than
the other. It is needed to rule out the trivial segregation ordering.
Nontriviality (N) There exist districts X,Y ∈ C such that X Â Y .
5 Results
We first show that the asymmetric Atkinson indices satisfy all of the axioms except Group
Symmetry, which is satisfied by the symmetric Atkinson index.
Proposition 1 Let w = (w1, . . . , wK) be a list of K non-negative weights that add up to
one. The segregation ordering represented by the asymmetric Atkinson index Aw satisfies
SI, IND, WSDP, N, and C. The segregation order represented by the Atkinson index A also
satisfies GS.
12Proof available on request.
13For instance, suppose a black student moves to a school that has higher proportions of both blacks and
Asians but fewer whites. Since there are more blacks, one might argue (using the transfer principle) that
segregation has gone up. On the other hand, blacks are now more integrated with Asians. One attempt to
overcome this diﬃculty appears in Reardon and Firebaugh [21].
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Proof. That the asymmetric Atkinson order satisfies N is obvious. It also satisfies C, since
it is represented by the continuous function Aw. The fact that the Atkinson ordering satisfies
SI follows from the fact that for any positive scalar α, tng =
Tng
Tg
=
αTng
αTg
. We now show that it
satisfies IND and WSDP.
IND Let X,Y ∈ C be two districts with the same group distributions, and the same total
populations, and let Z ∈ C be another district. We wish to show that Aw(X) ≥
Aw(Y ) if and only if Aw(X ] Z) ≥ Aw(Y ] Z). Let γg = Tg(X)Tg(X]Z) =
Tg(Y )
Tg(Y ]Z) and
ηg =
Tg(Z)
Tg(X]Z) =
Tg(Z)
Tg(Y ]Z) . Note that a proportion t
n
gγg of group-g students of the district
X ] Z attend school n ∈ N(X). Likewise, a proportion tngηg of group-g students of
the district X ]Z attend school n ∈ N(Z). Analogous statements are true for Y ]Z.
Accordingly,
Aw(X ] Z) ≥ Aw(Y ] Z)
⇔
X
n∈N(X)
µY
g∈G
¡
tngγg
¢wg¶+ X
n∈N(Z)
µY
g∈G
¡
tngηg
¢wg¶
≤
X
n∈N(Y )
µY
g∈G
¡
tngγg
¢wg¶+ X
n∈N(Z)
µY
g∈G
¡
tngηg
¢wg¶
⇔
X
n∈N(X)
µY
g∈G
¡
tngγg
¢wg¶ ≤ X
n∈N(Y )
µY
g∈G
¡
tngγg
¢wg¶
⇔
µY
g∈G
¡
γg
¢wg¶ X
n∈N(X)
Y
g∈G
¡
tng
¢wg ≤ µY
g∈G
¡
γg
¢wg¶ X
n∈N(Y )
Y
g∈G
¡
tng
¢wg
⇔
X
n∈N(X)
Y
g∈G
¡
tng
¢wg ≤ X
n∈N(Y )
Y
g∈G
¡
tng
¢wg
⇔ Aw(X) ≥ Aw(Y )
WSDP Let X be a district with a single school and let X 0 = h(tg)g∈G, (1− tg)g∈Gi the
district that results from dividing X into two schools. Then, since Aw maps districts
to the unit interval, Aw(X 0) ≥ 0 = Aw(X). Further, if the two schools of X 0 have the
same group distribution, then tg = tg0 for all g, g0 ∈ G, then Aw(X 0) = 1−
Q
g∈G t
wg
g −Q
g∈G (1− tg)
wg = 0 since the weights wg add up to one.
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GS Since the geometric average is a symmetric function, A satisfies GS.
Q.E.D.
The next two theorems are the main results of our paper. Theorem 1 states that our
set of axioms, less Group Symmetry, fully characterizes the family of asymmetric Atkinson
orderings.
Theorem 1 Let < be a segregation ordering on C that satisfies SI, WSDP, IND, N, and C.
There are fixed weights wg ≥ 0 for g = 1, ...,K, adding up to one, such that < is represented
by the asymmetric Atkinson index Aw(X).
An easy implication of Theorem 1 is that if the requirement of Group Symmetry is
added, then the weights wg must all be equal. Hence, the symmetric Atkinson ordering is
the unique ordering that satisfies this larger set of axioms. It turns out that this is still true
if Continuity is then removed from the set. This is the following result.
Theorem 2 The Atkinson ordering on C is the only ordering that satisfies GS, SI, WSDP,
IND, and N.
5.1 Independence of the Axioms
Are the axioms in Theorems 1 and 2 independent of each other? In this section, we show
that they are: for each of the axioms in each of the two theorems, there is an index that
violates it yet that satisfies the other axioms. Consequently, all of the axioms are needed
for our results to hold.
We first define a new segregation ordering. For any two diﬀerent vectors w and w0 of
group weights (each summing to one), consider the following lexicographic ordering:
X <w,w0 Y iﬀ
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
Aw(X) > Aw(Y )
or
Aw(X) = Aw(Y ) and Aw0(X) ≥ Aw0(Y )
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This ordering first uses the Atkinson index with weights w to rank districts. Any “ties” are
broken using the Atkinson index with weights w0. The following proposition uses this index
and the other indices defined in Section 3 to show that our axioms are independent of each
other.
Proposition 2 The axioms SI, WSDP, IND, N, and C are independent of each other, as
are the axioms GS, SI, WSDP, IND, and N. In particular:
• The symmetric Atkinson index A(X) satisfies all the axioms;
• any asymmetric Atkinson index with unequal weights satisfies all axioms but Group
Symmetry;
• the Mutual Information index satisfies all axioms but Scale Invariance;
• 1−A(X) satisfies all axioms but the Weak School Division Property;
• the Unweighted Dissimilarity index satisfies all axioms but Independence;
• the trivial index, which ranks all districts as equally segregated, satisfies all axioms but
Nontriviality;
• the lexicographic index <w,w0, for weights w 6= w0, satisfies all axioms but Group
Symmetry and Continuity (so C is independent of SI, WSDP, IND, N).
This proposition is summarized in Table 1. A check mark indicates that an index satisfies
a given axiom; an × indicates that it does not.
5.2 Additive Decomposability
It is often necessary to study segregation at several levels simultaneously. For instance, one
may be interested in how much of the classroom segregation in a district is due to residential
segregation, which tends to cause segregation between schools, and how much is due to
ability tracking, which tends to create segregation between the classrooms of a given school.
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GS SI WSDP IND N C
Symmetric Atkinson: A(X)
√ √ √ √ √ √
Aw(X) for w 6= (1/K, . . . 1/K) × √ √ √ √ √
Mutual Information M(X)
√ × √ √ √ √
1−A(X) √ √ × √ √ √
Unweighted Dissimilarity: DU (X)
√ √ √ × √ √
Trivial index
√ √ √ √ × √
Lexicographic <w,w0 for w 6= w0 × √ √ √ √ ×
Table 1: Independence of the axioms.
As a first step in studying this issue, one might wish to to write districtwide segregation as
the sum of between-school segregation and within-school (between-classroom) segregation.
In this section we show that only indices whose underlying orderings satisfy the axiom of
Independence can be decomposed in this way. This includes the Atkinson indices but not
the Unweighted Dissimilarity index.
The following notion of additive decomposability is due to Hutchens [12].14 For any dis-
trict Z, let the lower-case letter z denote the one-school district that results from combining
the students of Z into a single school. We say that the segregation index S is additively
decomposable if, for any (nonempty) districts X and Y ,
S(X ] Y ) = S(x ] y) + α(x, y)S(X) + β(x, y)S(Y ) (5)
where α(x, y) and β(x, y) are strictly positive. That is, the segregation of the combined
district X ] Y can be written as the sum of segregation between the districts, S(x] y), and
the weighted sum of segregation within the districts X and Y , where the weights α(x, y) and
β(x, y) depend only on the total numbers of each ethnic group in X and Y and not on their
allocation across schools within X or Y .
Proposition 3 Suppose S is an additively decomposable segregation index. Then the or-
dering represented by S satisfies Independence.
14Additive decomposability is one of the cardinal axioms in Hutchens’s axiomatization of the 2-group
symmetric Atkinson index (Hutchens [12]).
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Proof. Let X,Y ∈ C be two districts with the same group distributions, and the same total
populations. Let Z ∈ C be another district. We wish to show that S(X) ≥ S(Y ) if and
only if S(X ] Z) ≥ S(Y ] Z). Note that
S(X ] Z) = S(x ] z) + α(x, z)S(X) + β(x, z)S(Z) by (5)
= S(y ] z) + α(y, z)S(X) + β(y, z)S(Z) since x = y
while S(Y ] Z) = S(y ] z) + α(y, z)S(Y ) + β(y, z)S(Z) by (5). Since α(x, y) > 0 by
assumption, S(X ] Z)− S(Y ] Z) is proportional to S(X)− S(Y ). Q.E.D.
The Atkinson index with weights w = (w1, ..., wK) satisfies (5). More generally, let
Z = X1 ] · · · ]XN , where each Xi is a district. Then it is straightforward to verify that
Aw(Z) = Aw(x1 ] · · · ] xN) +
NX
i=1
αiAw(Xi)
where xi is the district that results from combining the students in Xi into a single school
and αi =
Q
g∈G
³
Tg(xi)
Tg(z)
´wg
.
Frankel and Volij [10] discuss a stronger type of additive separability, in which the weight
αi equals the proportion of students who are in district i. While intuitive, this stronger
property is not satisfied by the Atkinson indices or, indeed, by any of the other common
segregation indices (Frankel and Volij [10]).
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have provided an axiomatic justification for the Atkinson family of seg-
regation orderings using a parsimonious set of axioms. We have shown that the ordering
represented by the symmetric Atkinson index is the only (nontrivial) segregation ordering
that satisfies Symmetry, Scale Invariance, the Weak School Division Property, and Inde-
pendence. We also showed that a (nontrivial) segregation ordering is represented by an
asymmetric Atkinson index if and only if it satisfies Scale Invariance, the Weak School Di-
vision Property, Independence, and a technical continuity property.
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Our results provide a rigorous justification for using these segregation indices in ap-
plied contexts where our axioms are suitable. Researchers can use the Atkinson indices to
study segregation in the knowledge that their basic properties are simple and thoroughly
understood. This is especially important since the most popular segregation index, the Dis-
similarity Index (in either its weighted or unweighted form), has so far eluded an axiomatic
characterization.
Our indices diﬀer from the original Atkinson indices in two ways, one substantive and
the other less so. First, we have generalized them to any number of ethnic groups. This
allows their use in a general multiracial context. Second, for tractability, we have followed
Hutchens [13] in using the index Aw(X) rather than the original Atkinson index of James
and Taeuber [15], which equals 1 − (1 − Aw(X))2. Since orderings are preserved under
increasing transformations, our results apply to both versions.
6.1 Variable Number of Groups
We restrict attention to segregation orderings that rank districts with the same given number
of (nonempty) ethnic groups. If one district has two groups and another three, we do not
require the ordering to rank them. In fact, none of our axioms have any bite in this
situation. If we wanted to extend our characterization result to the class of all districts, we
would need to add an axiom restricting the way the ordering ranks districts with diﬀerent
numbers of groups. Frankel and Volij [10] address this issue and look for an alternative
segregation measure that can be used to compare districts with diﬀerent numbers of ethnic
groups. Specifically, they replace Scale Invariance with a new axiom, the Group Division
Property: if a given group is subdivided into two subgroups that have the same distribution
across schools, then the segregation of the district should not change. In order to obtain a
unique measure, they also strengthen the independence requirement. The resulting unique
measure is the Mutual Information index.
The weight assigned by the Mutual Information index to a given group depends on the
relative size of that group in its district. This means that if one ethnic group experiences
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relative growth in a district, while maintaining its distribution across schools, the weight
given by the Mutual Information index to this group will grow. For instance, if this group
is relatively isolated from other groups, the Mutual Information index will tend to rise.
For researchers who dislike this property, the present paper provides an alternative: they
can use an asymmetric Atkinson index that gives less weight to smaller groups. Like the
Mutual Information index, such an index would be relatively insensitive to the distribution
of the small groups across schools. However, it would also be Scale Invariant, and thus
invariant to population growth rates that diﬀer by ethnicity.
What weight should each group receive? One approach is to let a group’s weight equal
its proportion in the universe of districts under consideration (e.g., the state or country). If
longitudinal comparisons are being made, one could use an average of the group’s proportion
over the diﬀerent years. This could be weighted by the total population in each year or not,
depending on whether or not one wants to give each year or each student equal importance
in determining the group weights. While we do not provide an axiomatic justification of
such an approach, it has an intuitive interpretation: a group’s importance is proportional
to its relative size.
6.2 Related Literature
The first to study segregation axiomatically was Philipson [20]. He provides an axiomatic
characterization of a large family of segregation orderings that have an additively separable
representation. The representation consists of a weighted average of a function that depends
on a school’s demographic distribution only.
The papers that are most closely related to ours are Hutchens [12, 13]. These papers
study the measurement of segregation in the case of two demographic groups. Hutchens
[12] characterizes the family of indices that satisfy a set of basic properties. Hutchens [13]
strengthens one axiom and obtains a unique segregation index, which equals our symmetric
Atkinson index in the case of two demographic groups. While we assume properties of the
underlying segregation ordering, Hutchens follows the inequality literature (e.g., Shorrocks
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[22, 23]) by imposing restrictions directly on the segregation index. Chakravarty and Silber
[3] use a slightly diﬀerent set of axioms to characterize a set of segregation indices that
includes the symmetric Atkinson index.
Another related paper is Echenique and Fryer [9]. They use data on individuals’ social
networks to measure the strength of an individual’s isolation from members of other demo-
graphic groups. Echenique and Fryer’s characterize their segregation index using cardinal
axioms.
A Proofs
For any district X and any nonnegative constant c, let cX denote the district that results
from multiplying the number of members of each group in each school of X by c. For
any district X and any vector of nonnegative scalars −→α = (αg)g∈G, let −→α ∗ X denote the
district in which the number of members of group g in school n is αgT ng . For example, if
X = h(1, 2) , (3, 4)i, and −→α = (2, 3), then −→α ∗ X = h(2, 6) , (6, 12)i. We sometimes apply
the same operation to individual schools; e.g., −→α ∗ (1, 2) = (2, 6).
We first state and prove some preliminary lemmas.
Lemma 3 Let < be a segregation ordering on C that satisfies SDP and SI.
1. All districts in which every school is representative have the same degree of segregation
under <.
2. Any district in which every school is representative is weakly less segregated under <
than any district in which some school is unrepresentative.
Proof.
1. Consider any district Y in which every school is representative. Number the schools
1, ..., N . For each i = 1, ..., N , let Yi be the district that results from Y when the first
i schools of Y are combined into a single school. By SDP, for each i = 1, ..., N − 1,
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Yi ∼ Yi+1. Hence, by transitivity, Y = Y1 ∼ YN . YN contains a single school. But by
SI, any district with a single school is as segregated as any other district with a single
school.
2. Let Y be a district in which every school is representative and consider any district X
in which at least one school is unrepresentative. The above reasoning yields X < XN .
XN contains a single school, so it is representative. Therefore, by 1, X < Y .
Q.E.D.
Lemma 4 Let < be a segregation ordering on C that satisfies SDP and SI. All completely
segregated districts have the same degree of segregation under <, and are weakly more segre-
gated than any district in which any school is mixed.
Proof. Consider a completely segregated district X. Let X 0 be the district that results
from X when, for each group g ∈ G, all schools that contain only members of group g are
combined into a single school. (X 0 thus consists of K schools, each of which contains all
the members of a single group.) By iteratively applying SDP, X ∼ X 0. By SI, X 0 is as
segregated as any other district that consists of K schools, each of which contains all the
members of a single group. This implies that all completely segregated districts have the
same degree of segregation.
Now any district that has at least one mixed school can be converted into a completely
segregated district by dividing each school n into K distinct schools, each of which includes
all and only the members of a single group. By SDP, this procedure results in a weakly
more segregated district. Q.E.D.
Let X be a district with K groups of unit size who all attend in the same school: X =
­¡
1, 1, . . . , 1| {z }
K groups
¢®
. Let X be a district with K groups of unit size who all attend separate
schools:
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X =
¿³
1, 0, . . . , 0| {z }
K groups
´
,
³
0, 1, 0, . . . , 0| {z }
K groups
´
, ...,
³
0, ..., 0, 1| {z }
K groups
´
| {z }
K schools
À
.
We say that a school is a ghetto if all its students belong to the same group. We first
state and prove some auxiliary results about districts with a single non-ghetto school. For
any scalar α, let X(α) denote the district αX
U
(1 − α)X. City X(α) contains one school
with α students of each group, and K ghettos, each with 1− α students. Similarly, for any
vector t = (t1, ..., tK) ∈ [0, 1]K , let X(t) denote the district
t ∗X
U
(1− t) ∗X = ht, (1− t1, 0, ..., 0), (0, ..., 0, 1− tK)i
City X(t) consists of the non-ghetto school t, and for each group g, one ghetto with 1− tg
students of group g.
Lemma 5 Let < be a segregation ordering on C that satisfies SDP, IND, N, and SI. Then
1. X Â X;
2. for any α, β ∈ [0, 1], α > β, X(β) Â X(α).
Proof.
1. By N, there exist districts X and Y such that X Â Y . By lemmas 3 and 4, X < X Â
Y < X, so X Â X.
2. By part 1 and SI, (α − β)X Â (α − β)X. Since the numbers of members of each
group are equal in district X and in X, they are also equal in district (α − β)X and
in (α− β)X. So by IND,
βX ] (α− β)X ] (1− α)X Â βX ] (α− β)X ] (1− α)X.
The result follows from the fact that, by SDP,
βX ] (α− β)X ] (1− α)X ∼ βX ] (1− β)X
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and
βX ] (α− β)X ] (1− α)X ∼ αXU(1− α)X.
Q.E.D.
Claim 1 Lemma 6 Let t,v ∈ [0, 1]K, such that t ≤ v. Then, X(t) < X(v). If t =
(t1, ..., tK) ∈ (0, 1)K then X Â X(t) Â X.
Proof. Let t,v ∈ [0, 1]K , such that t ≤ v. Applying SDP twice, we obtain
X(t) = t ∗X
U
(1− t) ∗X
∼ t ∗X
U
(v− t) ∗X
U
(1− v) ∗X
< v ∗X
U
(1− v) ∗X = X(v).
Assume now that t = (t1, ..., tK) ∈ (0, 1)K , and let t = max{t1, ..., tK}, t = min{t1, ..., tK}.
Then,
X Â X(t) by Lemma 5
< X(t) since (t, . . . , t) ≤ t
< X(t) since t ≤(t, . . . , t)
Â X by Lemma 5.
Q.E.D.
Lemma 7 For any two vectors t,v ∈ [0, 1]K and for any γ ∈ (0, 1],
1. v∗X(t)
U
(1− v) ∗X ∼ X(v ∗ t)
2. γX(t)
U
(1− γ)X ∼ X(γt)
3. If for some α ∈ [0, 1], X(t) ∼ X(α), then X(v ∗ t) ∼ X(αv)
4. If for some α ∈ [0, 1], X(t) ∼ X(α), then X(γt) ∼ X(γα)
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Proof.
1. By definition of X(t) and by SDP,
v∗X(t)
U
(1− v) ∗X = v∗
¡
t∗X
U
(1− t) ∗X
¢U
(1− v) ∗X
∼ (v ∗ t) ∗X
U
(1− v ∗ t) ∗X
= X(v ∗ t).
2. The proof is analogous to the previous one.
3. Now, if for some α ∈ [0, 1], X(t) ∼ X(α), then, by SI and IND
v∗X(t)
U
(1− v) ∗X ∼ v∗X(α)
U
(1− v) ∗X
which, by the previous steps, implies X(v ∗ t) ∼ X(αv).
4. The proof is analogous to the previous one.
Q.E.D.
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Let < be a segregation ordering on C that satisfies C, SDP, IND, N, and SI. We first build
an index that represents <. Later we show that the index has the requisite form.
Lemma 8 For any district X, there is a unique αX ∈ [0, 1] such that X ∼ X(αX).
Proof. By C,
©
α ∈ [0, 1] : αX ] (1− α)X < Xª and ©α ∈ [0, 1] : X < αX ] (1− α)Xª
are closed sets. Any αX satisfies X ∼ X(αX) if and only if it is in the intersection of these
two sets. The sets are each nonempty by Lemmas 3 and 4. Their union is the whole unit
interval since < is complete. Since the interval [0, 1] is connected, the intersection of the
two sets must be nonempty. By Lemma 5, their intersection cannot contain more than one
element. Thus, their intersection contains a single element αX . Q.E.D.
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Let X and Y be two districts, and let αX , and αY be the respective scalars identified in
Lemma 8. Then, by Lemma 5, X < Y if and only if 1− αX > 1− αY , which implies that
the index S : C → [0, 1] defined by S(Z) = 1− αZ represents <.
We will now show that the index S has the requisite form.
Proposition 4 For each group g there is a fixed constant wg ≥ 0 such that for any β ∈ (0, 1],
X((1, . . . 1, β, 1, . . . 1)) ∼ X(βwg)
where (1, . . . 1, β, 1, . . . 1) is a vector with β in the gth place and ones elsewhere.
Proof. Let <+ denote the nonnegative reals. For any scalar β and any group g, let βg
denote the vector (1, . . . 1, β, 1, . . . 1) with β in the gth place and ones elsewhere. Similarly,
for all q ∈ <+, βqg denotes the vector (1, . . . 1, βq, 1, . . . 1)We prove the proposition by means
of the following two lemmas.
Lemma 9 Fix some β ∈ (0, 1], and let δ be the unique scalar such thatX((1, . . . 1, β, 1, . . . 1)) ∼
X(δ). Then, for all q ∈ <+
X(βqg) ∼ X (δq) (6)
Proof. We first show that δ satisfies (6) for all natural numbers q. By assumption δ satisfies
(6) for q = 1. Assume that for some natural n
X(βng ) ∼ X(δn) (7)
Then
X(βn+1g ) ∼ X(βg ∗ (βng ))
∼ X
¡
δ(βng )
¢
by Lemma 7
∼ δX
¡
βng
¢U
(1− δ)X by Lemma 7
∼ δX(δn)
U
(1− δ)X by (7) and IND
∼ X(δn+1) by Lemma 7
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This shows that (7) holds for all naturals.
We now show that δ satisfies (6) for all rational numbers. Let q = n/m be a rational
number. Then, (βn)g = (β
q)g ∗ (βm)g, and hence,
X(βng ) ∼ X(βqg ∗ βmg ).
By Lemma 8, there is a κ such that
X(βqg) ∼ X(κ) (8)
Therefore, by Lemma 7 and since (7) holds for all naturals,
X(βng ) ∼ X(κβmg )
∼ X(κδm)
On the other hand, since equation (7) holds for all naturals
X(βng ) ∼ X(δn)
hence X(κδm) ∼ X(δn) which, by Lemma 5, implies κ = δq. Substituting into equation (8),
we get
X(βqg) ∼ X(δq).
It remains to show that the statement of the lemma holds for all reals. Let r ∈ <+. By C,
the sets
S1 =
n
c ∈ [0, 1] : X((βr)g) < X (c)
o
and S2 =
n
c ∈ [0, 1] : X((βr)g) 4 X (c)
o
are both closed. Let {qn} be a sequence rational numbers such that qn ≥ r for all n that
converge to r. Since β ≤ 1, βqn ≤ βr, so, by Lemma 6, X(βqng ) < X(βrg) for all n. Since for
each n, qn is rational, X(βqng ) ∼ X(δqn). As a result we obtain X(δqn) < X(βrg). So δqn ∈ S2
for all n. Since S2 is closed and δqn converges to δr, we conclude that δr ∈ S2. A similar
argument shows that δr ∈ S1 as well. As a result X(βrg) ∼ X (δr). Q.E.D.
27
Lemma 10 For all g, there is a fixed constant wg ≥ 0 such that for any β ∈ (0, 1], the δ
given by Lemma 9 is δ = βwg .
Proof. Pick some β ∈ (0, 1) and let δ the scalar identified in Lemma 9. We must have
β ≤ δ. Otherwise we would have X(βg) ∼ X(δ) Â X(β) contradicting Lemma 6. Let wg
satisfy δ = βwg . Since β ≤ δ < 1, wg ≥ 0. Now consider any β0 ∈ (0, 1]. Let r be such that
β0 = βr. By Lemma 9,
X(β0qg ) = X(β
rq
g ) ∼ X (δrq) = X ([δr]q) for all q ∈ <+
which shows that the δ0 corresponding to β0 is just δr. Hence, δ0 = δr = (βwg)r = (βr)wg =
β0wg . Q.E.D.
This ends the proof of Proposition 4 Q.E.D.
Proposition 5 There are fixed, non-negative weights wg ≥ 0 for g = 1, ...,K such that
for any t ∈ [0, 1]K the unique α ∈ [0, 1] that satisfies X(t) ∼ X(α) is given by
KQ
g=1
(tg)
wg .
Further, the weights add up to one.
Proof. Case 1: t ∈ (0, 1]K .
Let t = (t1, . . . , tK) ∈ (0, 1]K . By Proposition 4,
X((1, 1, . . . 1, tg, 1, . . . 1)) ∼ X(twgg ) for all g = 1, . . .K.
Note that t =(t1, 1, ..., 1)∗(1, t2, 1, . . . 1)∗(1, . . . 1, tk). Then, repeated applications of Lemma
7 then yields
X(t) = X
³QK
g=1 t
wg
g
´
.
In order to complete the proof of case 1, we need to show that the weights wg add up to
one. Consider the district X = X(α) where α ∈ (0, 1). By the previous conclusion X ∼
X
³QK
g=1 α
wg
´
. By Lemma 5
³QK
g=1 α
wg
´
= α which implies that the weights wg add up to
one.
Case 2: t ∈ [0, 1]K\(0, 1]K.
28
By Lemma 8 there is an α ∈ [0, 1] such that X(t) ∼ X(α). We need to show that α > 0.
Let t(ε) = (t1(ε), ..., tK(ε)) be the school that results from t after replacing the 0 components
by ε > 0. Since t ∈ (0, 1]K , by Case 1, X(t(ε)) ∼ X(α(ε)) where α(ε) =
QK
g=1 tg(ε)
wg . By
Lemma 6, X(t) < X(t(ε)) which implies, X(α) < X(α()). By Lemma 5, α()) > α ≥ 0.
Since α(ε)→ 0 as ε→ 0, we obtain that α = 0. Q.E.D.
We now show that the statement of the theorem holds for districts with two non-ghetto
schools.
Proposition 6 Let t1, t2 ∈ [0, 1]K and let X = ht1, t2, (1 − t11 − t21, 0, ..., 0), ..., (0, ..., 0, 1 −
t1K − t2K)i be a district. There is a unique αX ∈ [0, 1] that satisfies X ∼ X(αX). It is given
by αX =
KQ
g=1
¡
t1g
¢wg + KQ
g=1
¡
t2g
¢wg , where the weights wg are those found in Proposition 5.
Proof. Uniqueness of αX follow from Lemma 5, so it is enough to show that αX =
KQ
g=1
¡
t1g
¢wg + KQ
g=1
¡
t2g
¢wg satisfies X ∼ X(αX). Assume first that tig ≤ 1/2 for i = 1, 2 and
g = 1, ...,K. First suppose that tig = 0 for some i and g. Assume WLOG that t21 = 0.
Then by Proposition 5 and SI,
ht2, (1− t11 − t21, 0, ..., 0), ..., (0, ..., 0, 1− t1K − t2K)i ∼ h(1− t11, 0, ..., 0), ..., (0, ..., 0, 1− t1K)i
so by IND, X ∼ X(t1). The result then follows from Proposition 5.
Now suppose that t1, t2 ∈ (0, 1]K. Assume WLOG that
KQ
g=1
¡
t1g
¢wg ≤ KQ
g=1
¡
t2g
¢wg . Define
etig = tig/(1 − t2g) for g = 1, ...,K and i = 1, 2. Note that KQ
g=1
³et1g´wg ≤ KQ
g=1
³et2g´wg . Define
τ =
KQ
g=1
³
t1g
t2g
´wg
=
KQ
g=1
µ
ht1g
ht2g
¶wg
≤ 1. We can write
X = ht1, (1− t11 − t21, 0, ..., 0), (0, 1− t12 − t22, 0, ..., 0), ..., (0, ..., 0, 1− t1K − t2K)i ]
­
t2
®
.
By SI
X ∼ Y ]
D³et21, ...,ft2K´E (9)
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where15
Y =
D³et11, ...,ft1K´ ,³1− et11, 0, ..., 0´ , ...,³0, ..., 0, 1−ft1K´E
= et1 ∗XK ] (1− et1) ∗XK .
By Proposition 5,
Y ∼ αYX ] (1− αY )X. (10)
where αY =
KQ
g=1
³et1g´wg . Define
Y 0 = τ et2 ∗X ] (1− τ et2) ∗X. (11)
We must verify that all entries in Y 0 are nonnegative. This holds if τ et2g ≤ 1 for all g. Since
t2g ≤ 1/2 for all g, it follows that et2g ≤ 1; since τ ≤ 1 as well, it follows that τ et2g ≤ 1.
Since
KQ
g=1
³
τ et2g´wg = KQ
g=1
³et1g´wg = αY , by Proposition 5,
Y 0 ∼ αYX ] (1− αY )X. (12)
It follows from (10) and (12) that Y ∼ Y 0. As a result,
X ∼ Y ] ­¡et21, ...,ft2K¢® by (9)
∼ Y 0 ] ­¡et21, ...,ft2K¢® by IND
∼ τ et2 ∗X ] (1− τ et2) ∗X ] ­¡et21, ...,ft2K¢® by (11)
∼ (τ + 1) et2 ∗X ] (1− τ et2) ∗X by SDP
∼ (τ + 1) t2 ∗X ] (1− (τ + 1) t2) ∗X by SI and definition of et2.
Therefore, using Proposition 5, X ∼ αXX ] (1− αX)X, where
αX = (τ + 1)
KY
g=1
¡
t2g
¢wg = KY
g=1
¡
t1g
¢wg + KY
g=1
¡
t2g
¢wg .
15We must check that Y has no negative entries. Since X cannot have negative entries, it must be that
t1g + t
2
g ≤ 1 for all g. Since in addition t2g < 1 for all g, it follows that
t1g
1−t2g
≤ 1 for all g. Hence, all entries
in Y are nonnegative.
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Consider now the case of general t1, t2 ∈ [0, 1]2. Define bti = 1
2
ti for i = 1, 2. Let
bX = hbt1,bt2, (1− bt11 − bt21, 0, ..., 0), (0, 1− bt12 − bt22, 0, ..., 0), ..., (0, ..., 0, 1− bt1K − bt2K)i.
Each entry in each vector is at most one half. By the preceding argument, there is a uniquebαX ∈ [0, 1] such that
bX ∼ bαXX ] (1− bαX)X. (13)
and this unique bαX is KQ
g=1
¡bt1g¢wg + KQ
g=1
¡bt2g¢wg . Further note that by SDP, bX ∼ 12X ] 12X.
Therefore
1
2
X ] 1
2
X ∼ bαXX ] (1− bαX)X
∼ 1
2
(2bαX)X ] (1− 1
2
(2bαX))X
∼ 1
2
(2bαX)X ] 1
2
(1− (2bαX))X ] 1
2
X
where the last line follows from SDP. Finally, by IND and SI
X ∼ (2bαX)X ] (1− (2bαX))X
which means that the unique αX that we are looking for is αX = 2bαX = KQ
g=1
¡
t1g
¢wg+ KQ
g=1
¡
t2g
¢wg .
Q.E.D.
Proposition 7 For every district X ∈ C there is a unique αX ∈ [0, 1] such that X ∼
αXX ] (1−αX)X. Further, this unique αX is
P
n∈N(X)
KQ
g=1
¡
tng
¢wg , where the weights wg are
those found in Proposition 5.
Proof. By SI it is enough to prove the statement for districts where all groups have a
population measure of one. Also, by SDP we can restrict attention to districts where for
each group there is at most one ghetto. The proof is by induction on the number of non-
ghetto schools. Propositions 5 and 6 already show the that the statement is true for districts
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with at most two non-ghetto schools. Assume that the statement of the theorem holds for
all districts with m− 1 non-ghetto schools, let
X = ht1, · · · , tm, (1−
mX
n=1
tn1 , 0, ..., 0), (0, 1−
mX
n=1
tn2 , 0, ..., 0), ..., (0, ..., 0, 1−
mX
n=1
tnK)i
be a district with m non-ghetto schools. Then one can write
X = Y ] htmi
where Y denotes X with school tm removed. Y has m− 1 non-ghetto schools. By SI
Y ] htmi ∼
∙µ
1
1− tm1
, ..,
1
1− tmK
¶
∗ Y
¸
]
¿µ
tm1
1− tm1
, ...,
tmK
1− tmK
¶À
.
By the induction hypothesis,
¡
1
1−tm1
, ..., 1
1−tmK
¢
∗Y ∼ αYX ] (1− αY )X where
αY =
m−1X
n=1
KY
g=1
µ
tng
1− tmg
¶wg
.
Using (in order) IND, SI, and Proposition 6,
∙µ
1
1− tm1
, ...,
1
1− tmK
¶
∗ Y
¸
]
¿µ
tm1
1− tm1
, ...,
tmK
1− tmK
¶À
∼ αYX ] (1− αY )X ]
¿µ
tm1
1− tm1
, ...,
tmK
1− tmK
¶À
∼ (1− tm1 , ..., 1− tmK) ∗
¡
αYX ] (1− αY )X
¢ ] htmi
∼ αXX ] (1− αX)X
where
αX =
KY
g=1
¡
1− tmg
¢wg αY + KY
g=1
¡
tmg
¢wg
=
KY
g=1
¡
1− tmg
¢wg m−1X
n=1
KY
g=1
µ
tng
1− tmg
¶wg
+
KY
g=1
¡
tmg
¢wg
=
mX
n=1
KY
g=1
¡
tng
¢wg .
Q.E.D.
This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
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A.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Proposition 1 implies that the Atkinson index A satisfies all the axioms of the theorem. We
now show that it is the only index to do so. We now show that any ordering that satisfies
GS, SI, SDP, IND, and N on C must be the Atkinson ordering. Let < be such an ordering.
Proposition 8 Let t = (t1, . . . , tK) ∈ [0, 1]K and let X = X(t). Then, there exists a unique
αX ∈ [0, 1] such that X ∼ X(αX). Further, this unique αX is
³ KQ
g=1
tg
´1/K
.
Proof. For existence, there are two cases.
Case 1: Suppose tg = 0 for some g. In this case we have to show that αX = 0 or, equivalently,
that X ∼ X. By GS, we can assume w.l.o.g. that t1 = 0. Therefore t = (0, t2, t3, ..., tK).
Let σ12 be the permutation that relabels groups 1 and 2 into 2 and 1, respectively. Therefore,
σ12t = (t2, 0, t3, ..., tK). Let 1 denote a vector of K ones. By GS,
t ∗X ] (1− t) ∗X ∼ σ12t ∗X ] (1− σ12t) ∗X.
For any β ∈ (0, 1), let γ = (β, 1, ..., 1). By SI and IND,
γ ∗
¡
t ∗X ] (1− t) ∗X¢ ] (1− γ) ∗X ∼ γ ∗ ¡σ12t ∗X ] (1− σ12t) ∗X¢ ] (1− γ) ∗X.
Hence, by SDP and GS,
(γ ∗ t) ∗X ] (1− γ ∗ t) ∗X ∼ (γ ∗ σ12t) ∗X ] (1− γ ∗ σ12t) ∗X
∼ [σ12 (γ ∗ σ12t)] ∗X ] (1− [σ12 (γ ∗ σ12t)]) ∗X. (14)
But note that since (γ ∗ t) = t, and σ12 (γ ∗ σ12t) = (0, βt2, t3, ..., tK),we can write (14) as
t ∗X ] (1− t) ∗X ∼ (0, βt2, t3, ..., tK) ∗X ] (1− (0, βt2, t3, ..., tK)) ∗X.
We can repeat this procedure for t3, ..., tK to obtain
t ∗X ] (1− t) ∗X ∼ (0, βt2, βt3, ..., βtK) ∗X ] (1− (0, βt2, βt3, ..., βtK)) ∗X
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namely,
X ∼ βt ∗X ] (1− βt) ∗X for all β ∈ (0, 1). (15)
Now choose some constants β, β0 ∈ (0, 1), β > β0. It follows from (15) that
βt ∗X ] (1− βt) ∗X ∼ β0t ∗X ] (1− β0t) ∗X.
Since βt = β0t|{z}
≥0
+(β − β0)t| {z }
≥0
, and 1− β0t = (β − β0)t| {z }
≥0
+(1− βt)| {z }
≥0
, by SDP
β0t ∗X ] (β − β0)t ∗X ] (1− βt) ∗X ∼ β0t ∗X ] (β − β0)t ∗X ] (1− βt) ∗X
Note that (1−βt) = (β − β0)(1− t)| {z }
≥0
+ [(1− β)1+β0(1− t)]| {z }
≥0
, so we can subdivide (1−βt)∗X
in the above expression using SDP again and get
β0t ∗X ] (β − β0)t ∗X ] (β − β0)(1− t) ∗X ] [(1− β)1+β0(1− t)] ∗X
∼ β0t ∗X ] (β − β0)t ∗X ] (β − β0)(1− t) ∗X ] [(1− β)1+β0(1− t)] ∗X.
By IND,
(β − β0)t ∗X ] (β − β0)(1− t) ∗X ∼ (β − β0)t ∗X ] (β − β0)(1− t) ∗X.
Finally by definition of SI, t ∗ X ] (1 − t) ∗ X ∼ t ∗ X ] (1 − t) ∗ X = X, as claimed.
Q.E.D.
Case 2. Suppose tg ∈ (0, 1] for all g. Let α =
³ KQ
g=1
tg
´1/K
, and let
Y = αX ] (1− α)X = h(α, ..., α), (1− α, 0, ..., 0), (0, 1− α, 0, ..., 0), ..., (0, ..., 0, 1− α)i.
We shall show that X ∼ Y and therefore that α is the αX we are looking for.
Let γ1 ∈ (0, 1). For g = 2, ...,K, define γg = γg−1
tg−1
α . Note that by definition of α,
γK = γ1
K−1Y
g=1
µ
tg
α
¶
= γ1
ÃK−1Q
g=1
tg
αK−1
!
= γ1
Ã
1/tK
1/α
KQ
g=1
tg
αK
!
= γ1
µ
1/tK
1/α
¶
= γ1
α
tK
=⇒ γ1 = γK
tK
α
.
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Now choose γ1 small enough that each γg ≤ 1; this holds if
max
g∈h2,...,Ki
γg = max
g∈h2,...,Ki
γ1
gY
j=2
µ
tj−1
α
¶
≤ 1.
Denote by γ = (γ1, . . . , γK) the K-tuple just built. Note that αγ is a permutation of γ ∗ t.
Now by definition of X and Y , by SI and IND, and by SDP
X ∼ Y ⇔ t ∗X ] (1− t)X ∼ αX ] (1− α)X
⇔ γ ∗
¡
t ∗X ] (1− t)X¢ ] (1− γ)X ∼ γ ∗ ¡αX ] (1− α)X¢ ] (1− γ)X
⇔ (γ ∗ t) ∗X ] (1− γ ∗ t)X ∼ (αγ) ∗X ] (1− αγ)X.
But the last two districts are equally segregated because αγ is a permutation of γ ∗ t and <
satisfies GS. Q.E.D.
Proposition 9 Let t1, t2 ∈ [0, 1]K and let X = ht1, t2, (1 − t11 − t21, 0, ..., 0), (0, 1 − t12 −
t22, 0, .., 0), ..., (0, ..., 0, 1 − t1K − t2K)i be a district. Then there is αX ∈ [0, 1] such that X ∼
X(αX). Further, αX is
³ KQ
g=1
t1g
´1/K
+
³ KQ
g=1
t2g
´1/K
.16
Proof. The proof is almost identical to the proof of Proposition 6. The only diﬀerence is
that here the weights are wg = 1/K, and instead of relying on Proposition 5 one needs to
rely on the analogous Proposition 8. Q.E.D.
Proposition 10 For every district X there is a unique αX ∈ [0, 1] such that X ∼ αXX ]
(1− αX)X. Further, this unique αX is
P
n∈N(X)
³ KQ
g=1
tng
´1/K
.17
Proof. The proof is almost identical to the proof of Proposition 9. The only diﬀerence is
that here the weights are wg = 1/K, and instead of relying on Proposition 5 and 6 one needs
to rely on the analogous Propositions 8 and 9. This ends the proof of the theorem. Q.E.D.
16This is less than or equal to 1 since the geometric average of a set of numbers can be no greater than
their arithmetic average:
³ KQ
g=1
t1g
´1/K
+
³ KQ
g=1
t2g
´1/K
≤ 1K
PK
g=1 t
1
g +
1
K
PK
g=1 t
2
g =
1
K
PK
g=1
¡
t1g + t2g
¢
≤
1
K
PK
g=1 1 = 1.
17By the reasoning given in footnote 16, αX must lie between zero and one.
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A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
GS: The fact that Group Symmetry is independent of the other axioms follows directly from
Theorems 1 and 2: for any vector of weights w 6= (1/K, . . . 1/K), the asymmetric Atkinson
index Aw represents a segregation order that satisfies SI, WSDP, IND, N, and C, but fails
GS.
WSDP: To see that WSDP is independent of the other axioms note that since the Atkinson
order satisfies GS, SI, IND, C and N, so does the order represented by the index 1 − A
(defined by (1−A)(X) = 1−A(X)). It is clear that this order does not satisfy WSDP.
N: The trivial segregation order, which ranks all districts as equally segregated, violates N
while satisfying all the other axioms.
IND: Consider the Unweighted Dissimilarity index DU . It is clear it satisfies N and GS. It
satisfies C since it is represented by a continuous function. SI follows from the fact that for
any positive scalar α, tng =
Tng
Tg
=
αTng
αTg
. WSDP holds since DU(X) ≥ 0 for all districts X, and
DU(X) = 0 if all the schools of X are representative. As for IND, consider the following
districts: X = h(2, 4), (2, 0)i and Y = h(4, 2), (0, 2)i. One computesDU(X) = DU(Y ) = 1/2.
Consider now the result of annexing to them the one-school district Z = h(4, 0)i. One can
verify that DU(X ] Z) = 3/4 while DU(Y ] Z) = 1/2. Hence, DU violates IND.
SI: The Mutual Information index M clearly violates SI. Since the entropy function is
symmetric,M satisfies GS. SinceM is continuous, it also satisfies C. That it satisfies WSDP
follows from the fact thatM(X) ≥ 0 for all districts X, and thatM(X) = 0 if all the schools
of X are representative. For a proof that the mutual information ordering satisfies IND, see
Frankel and Volij [10].
C: Let w =(wg)Kg=1 and w0=(w0g)Kg=1 be two diﬀerent vectors of weights that each sum to
one. It is easy to verify that <w,w0 satisfies SI, IND, WSDP, and N since Aw and Aw0 do.
It clearly violates GS since at least one weight vector must be asymmetric. In addition,
it violates C. To see why, let X and Y be two districts with diﬀerent group distributions
such that Aw(X) = Aw(Y ) < 1 and Aw0(X) < Aw0(Y ). Let c ∈ (0, 1) and consider the
district cX ] (1− c)Y . Let γg = cTg(X)cTg(X)+(1−c)Tg(Y ) and ηg = 1− γg. Note that a proportion
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tng (X)γg of group-g students of the district cX](1−c)Y attend school n ∈ N(X). Likewise, a
proportion tng (Y )ηg of group-g students of the district cX](1−c)Y attend school n ∈ N(Y ).
Therefore, we can write
1−Aw(cX ] (1− c)Y ) =
X
n∈N(X)
Y
g∈G
(tng (X)γg)
wg +
X
n∈N(Y )
Y
g∈G
(tng (Y )ηg)
wg
=
X
n∈N(X)
Y
g∈G
¡
tng (X)
¢wg ¡γg¢wg + X
n∈N(Y )
Y
g∈G
¡
tng (X)
¢wg ¡ηg¢wg
=
ÃY
g∈G
¡
γg
¢wg! X
n∈N(X)
Y
g∈G
¡
tng (X)
¢wg +ÃY
g∈G
¡
ηg
¢wg! X
n∈N(Y )
Y
g∈G
¡
tng (Y )
¢wg
= (1−Aw(X))
Y
g∈G
¡
γg
¢wg
+ (1−Aw(Y ))
Y
g∈G
¡
ηg
¢wg .
Since the group distributions of X and Y are not the same, there are groups g, g0 ∈ G with
γg 6= γg0. (Otherwise, for all groups g, γg equals a constant λ, which implies Tg(X)Tg(Y ) =
λ(1−c)
c(1−λ) .
Hence, X and Y must have the same group distribution, a contradiction.) Therefore, the
geometric average
Q
g∈G
¡
γg
¢wg is strictly lower than the corresponding arithmetic average, and
the same is true for
Q
g∈G
¡
1− γg
¢wg . As a result,
1−Aw(cX ] (1− c)Y ) < (1−Aw(X))
X
g∈G
wgγg + (1−Aw(Y ))
X
g∈G
wgηg.
(By assumption, Aw(X) and Aw(Y ) are strictly less than one.). Since Aw(X) = Aw(Y ),
and since c was arbitrary chosen from (0, 1), we obtain that Aw(cX ] (1 − c)Y ) > Aw(Y )
for all c ∈ (0, 1). Consequently the set
{c ∈ [0, 1] : cXU(1− c)Y <w,w0 Y }
equals [0, 1), which is not closed. Q.E.D.
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